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RINDAL AND ELCHINOV: 
A(N) (IMPENDING) REVOLUTION IN EU LAW ON PATIENT 
MOBILITY?
Tomislav Sokol*
Summary: This paper critically analyses EU law on patient mobi-
lity, which has developed in the last decade. It covers the European 
Court of Justice case law applying internal market rules to social se-
curity coverage of foreign health treatment, its relationship with the 
EU rules on the co-ordination of social security systems, and the re-
cent attempts at codifying the case law. The most recent EFTA Court 
judgment in the Rindal case, and its potential effects on EU law if the 
Court of Justice adopts the same reasoning in the pending Elchinov 
case, are investigated.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the implications of EU law 
on patient mobility on national social security systems, namely the-
ir autonomy to define the scope of their coverage of health care tre-
atment, and the consequences, within the framework of EU law, of 
applying certain legal techniques to define their social packages. Spe-
cial emphasis is put on the new EU Member States and Croatia. It is 
argued that these states are in a particularly delicate position in rela-
tion to EU law in terms of maintaining the financial stability and the 
social (in terms of solidarity) character of their social security systems.
The paper proposes certain solutions to accomplish a twofold objec-
tive: improving legal certainty at the European level (thus facilitating 
the free movement of patients), while, at the same time, respecting the 
Member States’ freedom to organise their social systems, in order to 
protect the solidarity on which those systems are based.
I. Introduction
Health care is one of the essential elements of any society. It affects 
all people, either directly, through treatment, or indirectly, through taxa-
tion or contributions. Since it is one of the universal issues which in-
fluence electoral outcomes, health care has enormous national political 
significance. This is probably the reason why it has remained the primary 
competence of Member States of the EU, with EU competences mainly 
limited to non-binding measures. 
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The division of competences is demonstrated by art 168 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU), dealing 
with public health, which recognises ‘the responsibilities of the Member 
States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and 
delivery of health services and medical care’.1 If we, furthermore, take 
into account that the possibilities of adopting secondary EU legislation 
in the area of public health are limited to very specific areas, like blood 
derivatives, quality standards for medicinal products and the like,2 we 
can see that EU Member States have significant legislative freedom to 
organise their health systems.
A similar situation exists in the area of social security. The legisla-
tive measures adopted by the EU in this area ‘shall not affect the right 
of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social 
security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilib-
rium thereof’.3 Furthermore, the adoption of EU secondary legislation in 
the area of social security is subject to a special legislative procedure, 
which includes unanimous decision-making by the Council and only the 
consultation of the European Parliament.4 Therefore, it is evident that 
the Member States have retained essential autonomy to define their own 
social security systems.
However, the case law of the European Court of Justice has, in the 
years following Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie,5 expanded 
the scope of primary law rules on freedom to provide and receive services 
in this traditionally exclusively national area, in situations where persons 
travel abroad for the purpose of obtaining health treatment. This develop-
ment has led to ambiguities about the consequences it could have on the 
regulation of national health care regulation and the possibilities for in-
dividuals to receive social (public) coverage of health treatment obtained 
in a Member State in which they are not socially protected. Additional 
ambiguities have been caused by the recent EFTA Court jurisprudence 6 
on patient mobility and the potential adoption of similar argumentation 
by the Court of Justice.7
The aim of this paper is to critically analyse the mentioned case law 
of the EFTA Court in terms of the profound consequences its reasoning 
might have on the Member States’ freedom to determine their social se-
curity coverage of health treatment obtained in Member States in which 
1 TFEU art 168 (7).
2 TFEU art 168 (4).
3 TFEU art 153 (4).
4 TFEU art 153 (2); TFEU art 21 (3).
5 Case C-158/96 [1998] ECR I-1931.
6 Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08 Olga Rindal and Therese Slinning v The Norwegian 
State [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 319.
7 Case C-173/09 Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v National Health Insurance Fund (pending).
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the patients are not socially protected. It is divided into five main parts. 
The first part describes the development of the EU legal framework on 
cross-border patient mobility and the main issues of this development in 
the area of the social security coverage of health treatment obtained in 
the other EU Member States. The second part deals with the new issues 
raised by the EFTA Court and its relationship to the Court of Justice 
case law. The third part deals with the latest attempt to codify the case 
law by way of EU secondary legislation.8 The fourth part analyses the 
consequences the described European legal framework could have on the 
national social security systems of the EU Member States, specifically 
the social security systems of the ‘new’ Member States of Central Europe, 
and of Croatia, once it joins the EU. The final part contains proposals 
for action, both at the EU and the national level, in order to improve le-
gal certainty, while protecting the solidarity on which the social security 
systems are based.
II. Current legal framework
1. Rules on the co-ordination of social security systems
When discussing patient mobility within the EU, it is first necessary 
to analyse the EU rules on the co-ordination of social security systems, 
which have represented the legal framework for cross-border patient mo-
bility for decades. For a significant period, the main instrument of social 
security co-ordination between the EU Member States was Regulation 
1408/71.9 It was ultimately replaced by Regulation 883/2004,10 which 
became applicable with the entry into force of its implementing Regulati-
on 987/200911 on 1 May 2010.12
8 Commission (EC) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care COM (2008) 414 final, 02 
July 2008 (hereinafter: Original Proposal).
9 Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community 
[1971] OJ L149/2, last amended by Regulation (EC) 1992/2006 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 18 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 
on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons 
and to members of their families moving within the Community [2006] OJ L392/1 (herein-
after: Regulation 1408/71); preceded by Regulation (EEC) 3 of the Council of 25 September 
1958 on social security for migrant workers [1958] OJ 30/561 (originally: Réglement 3 
concernant la sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants).
10 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1 (hereinafter: Regula-
tion 883/2004].
11 Regulation (EC) 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Septem-
ber 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L284/1.
12 A more detailed overview of Regulation 883/2004 can be found in Franz Marhold, ‘Mod-
ernisation of European Coordination of Sickness Benefits’ (2009) 11 European Journal of 
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It is important to note that the co-ordination rules do not aim to 
harmonise national rules in the area of social security.13 It is their goal, 
rather, to provide solutions for legal situations in which a person, due to 
his/her cross-border movement, comes into contact with several national 
social security (legal) systems, in which problems may arise, specifically 
the consequences of losing social security entitlements. What is especi-
ally important is that EU co-ordination does not mean replacing the (body 
of) national rules with EU rules; it only affects those national provisions 
which deal with migrants, specifically by overriding the national rules 
which are disadvantageous to them.14 National social security systems, in 
the area of health care, are generally free to determine the level and scope 
of their social security health coverage by themselves.
Due to the different rules the national social security systems use to 
determine their personal scope of application, positive and negative con-
flicts of law may occur.15 A negative conflict of law arises when a person 
is living in a Member State which determines the scope of application of 
its social security system by reference to the conducting of a professional 
activity (as an employed or self-employed person, for instance),16 while 
working in a Member State whose social security system applies to all its 
inhabitants.17 In this case, if the Member States apply only their national 
applicability rules, the person will be left without social protection. Since 
these kinds of possibilities would be detrimental to the mobility of wor-
kers within the EU, EU primary law, among its provisions on free move-
ment of workers, contains a specific legal basis designed for the adoption 
of measures on social security co-ordination.18 This legal basis was used 
Social Security 119; Frans Pennings, ‘Introduction: Regulation 883/2004 - The Third Coor-
dination Regulation in a Row’ (2009) 11 European Journal of Social Security 3; Yves Jorens 
and Filip Van Overmeiren, ‘General Principles of Coordination in Regulation 883/2004’ 
(2009) 11 European Journal of Social Security 47; Paul Schoukens and Danny Pieters, ‘The 
Rules within Regulation 883/2004 for Determining the Applicable Legislation’ (2009) 11 
European Journal of Social Security 81.
13 Vassilis G Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but Healing 
Patients? The European Market for Health Services after the Judgements of the ECJ in 
Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 683, 686.
14 Frans Pennings, Introduction to European Social Security Law (4th edn Intersentia, Ant-
werp 2003) 7.
15 Pennings (n 14) 6.
16 These systems can be characterised as ‘professional or occupational social insurances’. 
See Danny Pieters, Social Security: An Introduction to the Basic Principles (2nd edn Kluwer 
Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2006) 21-22.
17 These systems can be characterised as ‘peoples or universal social insurances’. See Piet-
ers (n 16).
18 TFEU art 48, former Article 51 of The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity (hereinafter: EEC Treaty) and Article 42 of The Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (hereinafter: EC Treaty).
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to adopt Regulation 1408/71 and subsequently Regulation 883/2004.19 
The regulations are based on the principle of lex loci laboris (law of the 
place of work) which means that in cross-border situations (for instan-
ce that of the same person living in one Member State while working in 
another) a person will be subject to the legal system of the Member State 
in which he/she works, which is the competent state. This is a general 
rule, with many exceptions. 20
One of the situations that the co-ordination rules deal with is that of 
a person socially insured in one Member State (hereinafter: the compe-
tent state) who obtains health treatment in another Member State. There 
are several situations to be distinguished here, the most important of 
which are sketched below. In all these cases, the treatments are provided 
according to the rules of the state of treatment (including its tariffs), while 
the refund, on the other hand, is provided by the competent state.
The basic situations are:
1) A person insured in Member State A with residence in Member 
State B is entitled to health care in Member State B. The compe-
tent institution (health insurer) covers the cost of the foreign tre-
atment according to the foreign tariff (tariff applicable in the state 
of residence), as though the person was insured in his/her state 
of residence. The person is also entitled to health care treatment 
in Member State A when he/she is (temporarily) staying there, 
under its tariffs.21
2) When a person insured in Member State A is (temporarily) staying 
in Member State B, that person is entitled to necessary health 
care, ‘taking into account the nature of the benefits and the 
expected length of stay’. The competent institution covers the cost 
according to the tariff applicable in Member State B, where the 
health treatment was provided. 22
3) When a person insured in Member State A travels to Member State 
B for the purpose of obtaining health treatment, he/she must ask 
for authorisation from his/her health insurer in order to obtain 
social coverage of the treatment. This authorisation must be gran-
ted where: 
19 EEC Treaty art 7 (equivalent to former EC Treaty art 12 and today’s TFEU art 18) pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality was also used for the original Regulation 
1408/71, while EEC Treaty art 235 (equivalent to former EC Treaty art 308 and today’s 
TFEU art 352) was used both for amending Regulation 1408/71 and adopting Regulation 
883/2004. EC Treaty art 63(4) (today’s TFEU art 79(2)) was used to extend the scope of ap-
plication of Regulation 1408/71 to third country nationals.
20 Regulation 883/2004 art 11-16; Regulation 1408/71 art 13-17.
21 Regulation 883/2004 art 17-18; Regulation 1408/71 art 19(1), 21(1).
22 Regulation 883/2004 art 19; Regulation 1408/71 art 22(1).
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…the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the 
legislation in the Member State where the person concerned resides 
and where he cannot be given such treatment within a time-limit 
which is medically justifiable, taking into account his current state 
of health and the probable course of his illness.23
There are also specific rules for the social coverage of health care 
obtained by pensioners in those three basic situations:
1) A pensioner receiving a pension under the rules of Member State 
A with residence in Member State B (and not entitled to health 
care under the rules of Member State B) will receive health care 
in Member State B if he/she is entitled to health care in Member 
State A in the case of residence there. The competent institution of 
Member State A covers the cost of the treatment according to the 
tariffs applicable in the state of residence. If the pensioner is en-
titled to health care in more than one Member State (from which 
he/she receives pensions), social coverage will be provided by the 
institution of the Member State in which he/she was insured for 
the longest period of time.24
2) A pensioner temporarily staying in Member State C outside his/
her Member State of residence (Member State B) is entitled to 
necessary health care, as the latter is defined in Regulation 
883/2004 art 19, which means ‘taking into account the nature of 
the benefits and the expected length of stay’. The costs are cove-
red by the competent institution of Member State A (from which 
the pension is paid) according to the tariff of the state of treatment 
(Member State C). 25
3) When a pensioner receiving a pension from Member State A travels 
to Member State B for the purpose of obtaining health treatment, 
he/she must ask for authorisation from the competent institution 
of Member State A. The requirements for granting authorisation 
are the same as for insured persons, and the tariffs of Member 
State B are applicable. If the pensioner has residence in Member 
State C, which receives reimbursement from Member State A on 
23 Regulation 883/2004 art 20; Regulation 1408/71 art 22(2) contained an equivalent pro-
vision, but it stated that the authorisation may not be refused when the person cannot be 
given the treatment within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in ques-
tion in the Member State of residence, taking into account his current state of health and 
the probable course of the disease.
24 Regulation 883/2004 art 24; Regulation 1408/71 art 28.
25 Regulation 883/2004 art 27(1); Regulation 1408/71 art 31 provided that these costs 
were to be covered by the state of residence.
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the basis of fixed amounts, Member State C is considered to be 
the competent state.26
Of all the described situations, this paper focuses on that of a person 
travelling to another Member State for the purpose of obtaining socially 
covered health treatment (the prior authorisation procedure), due to the 
evolving case law of the Court of Justice applying internal market rules in 
this area. The paper deals with the interaction between the prior authori-
sation procedure, as defined in the co-ordination rules described above, 
and the Court of Justice (and EFTA Court) jurisprudence based on the 
direct application of primary law.
Within the context of prior authorisation, it is important to mention 
the Court of Justice judgement in Vanbraekel.27 This was a case of a Bel-
gian national, Ms Descamps, insured in Belgium, who was unlawfully, 
according to Belgian rules, refused authorisation (which was found by 
the Court to fall under Regulation 1408/71) for hospital treatment in 
France, which she underwent anyway. After obtaining the treatment, she 
claimed reimbursement from the Belgian insurer.28 If the French rules 
were applicable, she would have been entitled to reimbursement smaller 
than if the Belgian rules applied. 
The Court decided that:
Article 59 of the EC Treaty is to be interpreted as meaning that, if 
the reimbursement of costs incurred on hospital services provided 
in a Member State of stay, calculated under the rules in force in that 
State, is less than the amount which application of the legislation 
in force in the Member State of registration would afford to a person 
receiving hospital treatment in that State, additional reimbursement 
covering that difference must be granted to the insured person by 
the competent institution.29
The wording of the cited paragraph is very general, so one might 
conclude that every time a patient obtains health treatment abroad, the 
insurer is obliged to calculate the amount of coverage according to both 
coverage systems (the co-ordination system based on the state of tre-
atment tariffs, and the primary law system based on the competent state 
26 Regulation 883/2004 art 27(3) and art 27(5); Regulation 1408/71 art 22(1)c as inter-
preted by the Court of Justice in Case 182/78 Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Dren-
the-Platteland v G Pierik [1978] ECR 1977 and Case C-156/01 RP van der Duin v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ANOZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij 
ANOZ Zorgverzekeringen UA v TW van Wegberg-van Brederode [2003] ECR I-7045.
27 Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance nationale des mutualités chré-
tiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363. 
28 Ms Descamps who obtained the treatment abroad died in the course of the proceedings 
and her heirs, namely her husband, Mr Vanbraekel, pursued the action.
29 Vanbraekel (n 27) para 53.
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tariffs, which is analysed in more detail under 2), and apply the one which 
is more favourable for the patient. This interpretation, of course, leads to 
practical problems for health insurers in having to make calculations on 
the basis of both domestic and foreign rules. However, the subsequent 
case law refined the described reasoning, as demonstrated in 2.5.
Consideration should also be given to Keller.30 The case was about 
a German national, Ms Keller, living in Spain (which was the competent 
state) who underwent health treatment in Switzerland, where she was 
referred by German doctors, since her health problems had become evi-
dent during her temporary stay in Germany. The question arose about 
whether the competent institution should reimburse the costs, since it 
did not grant prior authorisation for treatment in a state outside the EU.
The Court held that, since the competent institution issued an E 
111 form entitling the patient to immediately necessary treatment during 
a temporary stay abroad,31 and an E 112 form authorising health tre-
atment in Germany, it thereby agreed to the application of German rules. 
This agreement, according to the Court’s interpretation of the co-ordi-
nation rules (under which the patient is treated according to the law of 
the state of treatment) means that the state of treatment is bound by the 
findings of the German doctors regarding the need for urgent (immedia-
tely necessary) treatment. The obligation applies even if that treatment is 
provided outside the EU.32
2. Direct application of primary law
The Court of Justice has, since 1998, laid down several rulings on 
the social security coverage of health treatment obtained in the Member 
States in which the patients are not socially protected.33 These judge-
30 Case C-145/03 Heirs of Annette Keller v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) 
[2005] ECR I-2529. 
31 Regulation 1408/71 art 22(1)a provided that during a temporary stay abroad a person 
whose condition necessitates immediate health treatment is entitled to that treatment. This 
provision was amended by Regulation (EC) 631/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 31 March 2004 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the ap-
plication of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to 
members of their families moving within the Community, and Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, in 
respect of the alignment of rights and the simplification of procedures, art 1(1). The latter 
regulation inserted the new provision, according to which the person shall be entitled to 
health treatments which become necessary during a temporary stay abroad, taking into ac-
count the nature of the benefits and the expected length of stay.
32 Keller (n 30) para 53.
33 Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR 
I-1831; Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; 
Case C-157/99 BSM Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and HTM Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 VG Müller-Fauré v 
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ments have dealt with the application of free movement rules (namely, 
freedom to provide and receive services34) representing ‘one of the most 
dynamic fields of Community law’.35
2.1. The first cases in, by now, a long line, were Kohll and Decker. 
These created quite a storm when they came out, due to their potential 
implications on the national social security systems, one of the corner-
stones of the Member States’ policies.36 They ‘established clearly, for the 
first time, that the economic rules regarding the free movement of goods 
and services within the EU could be applied to social security systems.’37 
Kohll was the case of a Luxembourg national, insured with a Luxem-
bourg health insurer, for whose daughter authorisation for orthodontist 
treatment in Germany was refused. The question was raised before the 
Court of Justice about the compatibility with the freedom to provide ser-
vices of national rules that imposed the condition that prior authorisati-
on should be obtained before foreign treatment could be covered.
Decker dealt with the situation of a Luxembourg national, as in 
Kohll, insured with a Luxembourg health insurer, who was refused the 
reimbursement of costs of spectacles purchased in Belgium. The reim-
bursement was refused by the insurer because prior authorisation had 
not been given. Here, the question arose of compatibility with the free 
movement of goods of national provisions that imposed the condition that 
prior authorisation was to be granted before foreign medical products 
could be covered.38
The judgements were rendered on the same day and were based on 
the same reasoning. At the outset, the Court concluded that the internal 
market provisions are indeed applicable to social security. It started by 
Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and EEM van Riet v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ZOA Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-326/00 Idryma 
Koinonikon Asfaliseon (IKA) v Vasilios Ioannidis [2003] ECR I-1703; Case C-56/01 Patri-
cia Inizan v Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2003] ECR I-12403; 
Case C-496/01 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2004] ECR 
I-2351; Case C-8/02 Ludwig Leichtle v Bundesantstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-2641; Case 
C-372/04 The Queen on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust Sec-
retary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325; Case C-466/04 Manuel Acereda Herrera v Ser-
vicio Cántabro de Salud [2006], ECR I-5341; Case C-444/05 Aikaterini Stamatelaki v NPDD 
Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE) [2007] ECR I-3185.
34 EC Treaty art 59 (after amendment EC Treaty art 49 and today’s TFEU art 56) and EC 
Treaty art 60 (after amendment EC Treaty art 50 and today’s TFEU art 57).
35 Vicki Paskalia, ‘Co-ordination of Social Security in the European Union: An Overview of 
Recent Case Law’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 1177, 1202. 
36 For a more detailed summary, see Pedro Cabral ‘Cross-Border Medical Care in the Eu-
ropean Union: Bringing Down a First Wall’ (1999) 24 EL Rev 387.
37 Elias Mossialos and Martin McKee, EU Law and the Social Character of Health Care 
(Work and Society Series vol 38, Peter Lang, Brussels 2002) 99.
38 EC Treaty art 30 (after amendment EC Treaty art 28 and today’s TFEU art 34).
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emphasising that the Member States had freedom to organise their social 
security systems. However, in doing so, the Member States must comply 
with Community (Union) law, since ‘the special nature of certain services 
does not remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of 
freedom of movement’.39 Unfortunately, no additional argumentation was 
provided.
Furthermore, the Court dealt with the potential paradox that the 
authorisation procedure, prescribed by the co-ordination rules, could in 
fact be contrary to primary law. A solution was found which has been 
debated ever since. The Court interpreted the co-ordination rules as re-
presenting only one way of obtaining social security coverage of health 
treatment obtained in other Member States. This was that authorisati-
on was needed to obtain coverage according to the legislation (including 
tariffs) applicable in the state of treatment. However, imposing only the 
co-ordination method represents a barrier to the free movement of goods 
and freedom to provide services (more precisely, the patient’s freedom to 
travel abroad and receive health services, but the primary law language 
of ‘freedom to provide services’ will be used).40
The other way, in effect newly established by the Court, allows the 
patient to travel to another Member State for the purpose of obtaining 
health treatment, without the need to receive prior authorisation from 
the health insurer. The latter patient is entitled to reimbursement based 
on the tariffs of the competent state.41 Unlike under the co-ordination 
rules,42 the patient who bases his/her claim for the social coverage of fo-
reign treatment on primary law is obliged in all cases to pay on the spot, 
while claiming reimbursement a posteriori from the competent state’s so-
cial insurer. 
After determining that making prior authorisation a condition for 
the reimbursement of all health treatment obtained abroad is contrary 
to internal market rules, the Court analysed the possible justifications of 
the national rules in question. First, it dealt with the argument of mainta-
ining the financial balance of the social security system as an overriding 
reason in the general interest. Here, the Court applied the rule of rea-
son.43 The conclusion was that although protecting the financial stability 
39 Kohll (n 33) para 20.
40 Kohll (n 33) para 35; Decker (n 33) para 36. 
41 Kohll (n 33) para 27; Decker (n 33) para 29.
42 There, the procedure depends on the rules of the state of treatment. 
43 For the application of the rule of reason, three requirements need to be satisfied in order 
for the national measure in question to be justified: application without distinction of the 
national rule in question; the public-interest requirement (overriding reason in the general 
interest); and proportionality. See to this effect Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Consti-
tutional Law of the European Union (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2005) 234-236.
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of the social security system could represent a ground for justification, 
reimbursing foreign treatment on the basis of domestic tariffs cannot 
have significant financial consequences on the social security system.44 
The Court thus dismissed the national rule as being unnecessary for 
achieving the invoked objective.45
Second, the Court rejected the public health argument (justification 
provided explicitly by primary law46) that the quality control of foreign 
health treatment and medical products can be made only at the time of 
the request for authorisation (it is too late after the treatment, of course,). 
The Court’s reasoning was based on the fact that the requirements for 
the providers in the professions (dentists and opticians) in question have 
been harmonised at the EU level,47 implying that the quality of health 
care does not vary significantly between the different Member States.48 
Third, the Court acknowledged that the protection of a balanced me-
dical and hospital service open to all can also be used as a public health 
justification for national rules on prior authorisation. However, it dismi-
ssed this argument in the concrete case, for the lack of evidence that a 
balanced medical service is jeopardised by allowing patients to obtain 
foreign treatment without prior authorisation. Again, the measure was 
deemed unnecessary in achieving the objective.49
The judgements in Kohll and Decker, by directly applying internal 
market rules in the area of social security, represented a significant 
change in the relationship between the Member States and the Union, 
reducing the Member States’ freedom to organise their social security co-
verage. Significantly, they left several questions unanswered. First, since 
the facts of the cases dealt with non-hospital treatment, it was unclear 
whether the same reasoning applied also to hospitals. Second, it was 
unclear whether the Court’s reasoning can be applied in the context of 
benefits-in-kind health care systems and national health services, since 
the judgements concerned the Luxembourg reimbursement system.50 
44 Kohll (n 33) para 42; Decker (n 33) para 40.
45 Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 43) 236.
46 EC Treaty art 56 (after amendment EC Treaty art 46 and today’s TFEU art 52) and EC 
Treaty art 66 (after amendment EC Treaty art 55 and today’s TFEU art 62) for services; EC 
Treaty art 36 (after amendment EC Treaty art 30 and today’s TFEU art 36) for goods.
47 Kohll (n 33) para 47; Decker (n 33) para 42.
48 Currently harmonised by Directive (EC) 2005/36 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ 
L255/22.
49 Kohll (n 33) paras 50-52. 
50 Social health care systems can, generally, be divided into two main types. Social health 
insurance, in principle, covers economically active persons, is mainly financed from con-
tributions, and the insurer and the provider are separate entities. National health services 
(as in the UK) in principle cover all the inhabitants, are financed through taxation, with 
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Applying the subsequent reimbursement mechanism for foreign tre-
atment could cause serious problems for national health services which 
are, in principle, free of charge, and, therefore, might not have defined 
tariffs at all. Finally, the question of the mutual relationship of the two 
parallel systems of coverage (one based on the co-ordination rules and 
the other based on the internal market rules of primary law) and their 
possible convergence was left open.
2.2. Some answers came in Geraets-Smits, delivered on 12 July 
2001. Geraets-Smits dealt with two cases of Dutch nationals (Mrs Gera-
ets-Smits and Mr Peerbooms) insured in the Netherlands, who obtained 
complex hospital health treatment in Germany and Austria. The reim-
bursement of costs was refused because it was claimed by the insurance 
funds that the statutory requirements had not been met. The national 
rules provided for the coverage of treatment in a foreign hospital being 
subject to prior authorisation. The authorisation would be given if the 
health treatment was among the benefits for which the sickness insuran-
ce scheme of the first Member State assumed responsibility, which was 
only the case for treatment ‘normal in the professional circles concerned’. 
Second, it was prescribed that treatment abroad must be necessary 
for the patient’s medical condition, meaning that adequate care cannot 
be provided without undue delay by a health care provider contracted 
by the health insurance fund from the Netherlands. The legality of these 
provisions, in relation to the rules on freedom to provide services, came 
before the Court.
The Court, at the outset, stated that ‘medical activities fall within 
the scope of Article 60 of the Treaty, there being no need to distinguish 
in that regard between care provided in a hospital environment and care 
provided outside such an environment’.51 No additional argumentation 
for this statement was provided.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that, although the health system 
in the Netherlands was a benefits-in-kind system, internal market rules 
still applied in the case.52 This was contrary to the reasoning of Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, who held that the provisions on the free-
dom to provide services cannot be applied to the Dutch benefits-in-kind 
systems, since there is no remuneration for the treatment in question. 
He emphasised that the patient does not pay for the service by himself/
payer and the provider being a single entity. Insurance systems can further be divided into 
reimbursement systems, where the patient pays the provider on the spot, subsequently be-
ing reimbursed by the insurer, and the benefits-in-kind systems, where the insurer pays 
the provider directly. The latter system can also be called ‘third party payment system’. See 
Pieters (n 16) 89.
51 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 53.
52 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 55. 
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herself, while the payments made by insurance funds are based on fixed 
amounts and are defined in advance, their primary purpose being to fi-
nance the providers (such as hospitals) instead of representing a market 
exchange.53 This issue is dealt with in more detail in 2.5.
After determining that internal market rules are applicable in the 
case, the Court concluded that the contested national rules did represent 
a barrier to the freedom to provide services, since they deterred patients 
from applying to health care providers in other Member States. This was 
decided despite the fact that the Dutch health insurance funds could, 
potentially, enter into agreements with foreign providers. However, since 
it was unlikely that significant numbers of foreign hospitals would enter 
into such agreements, the effective barrier was clear.54
Next, the Court analysed the potential justifications for restricting 
internal market freedom. It accepted that, in the case of hospital tre-
atment, a prior authorisation procedure can be justified for reasons of: 
1. Sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-qu-
ality hospital treatment in the State concerned.55
2. Cost control within the hospital sector.56
To see whether the national measure in question could be justified, 
the Court turned to the content of the authorisation procedure. There, it 
determined that the requirement for the treatment in question to be nece-
ssary within the professional circles concerned was in itself not contrary 
to EU law. However, the professional circles concerned must not be limi-
ted to those of the Netherlands, since that would represent a discrimina-
tion of foreign treatment and providers. The criterion must be objective, 
based on the standards developed by international medical science.57 
The mentioned reasoning means that a national rule determining 
coverage not on the basis of precisely defined socially covered treatment 
and conditions, but on general criteria like ‘normal treatment’, ‘advanced 
technical treatment’, ‘necessary treatment’, is more likely, in practice, to 
be contrary to EU law, since it is very hard to define concepts by using 
international definitions. The reason for the latter claim is the specific 
nature of the health system, which is tailor-made for the needs at the 
national level, and the relevant legal terms are defined accordingly. 
53 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Geraets-Smits (n 33) delivered on 
18 May 2000 para 29.
54 Geraets-Smits (n 33) paras 62-69.
55 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 78. 
56 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 79. According to the Court, the mentioned arguments are in-
trinsically linked to the financial balance justification and are, thus, analysed together. See 
Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 73.
57 Geraets-Smits (n 33) paras 94-98. 
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When it comes to the second requirement, that of necessity, for gran-
ting authorisation, the Court held that: 
...authorisation to receive treatment in another Member State may 
be refused on that ground only if the same or equally effective tre-
atment can be obtained without undue delay from an establishment 
with which the insured person’s sickness insurance fund has con-
tractual arrangements.58 
In this way, the body deciding on granting authorisation must take 
into account a wide number of factors.59 What is important is that these 
factors are those of each individual case, thus giving priority to the inte-
rests of individual patients applying for authorisation over the interests 
of the social security systems based on solidarity. The patients who will 
benefit most from this reasoning are those who are well off, who are able 
to pay for the foreign treatment on the spot (which patients do not have to 
do under the co-ordination rules if the state of treatment does not apply 
the reimbursement system, but which they have to do under the primary 
law route) and those who have enough time and resources to engage in a 
possible subsequent legal dispute if the social security institution of the 
competent state refuses to cover the cost of the foreign treatment.
Furthermore, a person who is seriously ill and in pain can use fo-
reign treatment to bypass those on the waiting list who are in need of 
treatment more urgently (because they are in more pain, for example) but 
who are physically unable to travel abroad.60 In that hypothetical case, 
the treatment must be granted, since the individual case which is decided 
is isolated from the context of the social security system.61 In addition, 
the Court did not explain what happens if the treatment abroad is more 
effective than the domestic treatment available for the same diagnosis.
The patient cannot go abroad to obtain health treatment which is 
not covered domestically by his/her social health insurer, since:
...Community law cannot in principle have the effect of requiring a 
Member State to extend the list of medical services paid for by its 
social insurance system: the fact that a particular type of medical 
58 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 103.
59 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 104.
60 This argument was put forward in relation to Watts (n 33) by Christopher Newdick, ‘Citi-
zenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, 1662. 
61 For an additional analysis of the relationship between the concept of solidarity and the 
Court of Justice case law, see Christopher Newdick ‘The European Court of Justice, Trans-
National Health Care, and Social Citizenship: Accidental Death of a Concept?’ (2009) 26 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 844. 
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treatment is covered or not covered by the sickness insurance sche-
mes of other Member States is irrelevant in this regard.62
Of course, the opposite possibility would be detrimental to the finan-
cial sustainability of social health coverage systems, especially in those 
Member States which are not financially capable of covering the most 
advanced and expensive health treatment. 
2.3. The next important judgement dealing with the prior authorisa-
tion procedure was Müller-Fauré.63 The case involved two ladies insured 
in the Netherlands who underwent health treatment in other Member 
States. Ms Müller-Fauré underwent dental treatment in Germany, whi-
le Ms Van Riet was subjected to arthroscopy in Belgium. Both patients 
obtained their treatment without prior authorisation and reimbursement 
was denied by their insurers. The question of the legality of the prior 
authorisation procedure in the context of the freedom to provide services 
again arose.
The judgement is important because the Court explicitly distinguis-
hed between two situations. In relation to hospital treatment, the Court 
concluded that the prior authorisation requirement is a justified barrier 
to the free provision of services because of the need to maintain a balan-
ced allocation of hospital resources, which would be jeopardised in the 
case of an uncontrolled outflow of patients to foreign hospitals.64 Howe-
ver, it again emphasised, as part of the ‘undue delay’ requirement, the 
need to look at the individual situation of the patient concerned, taking 
into account his/her medical history, degree of pain and the ability to 
conduct  professional activity.65
Regarding non-hospital treatment, the Court held that the prior aut-
horisation requirement cannot be justified by the need to maintain finan-
cial balance in the social security system. The argument was that it is unli-
kely that significant numbers of patients would travel to seek non-hospital 
health care abroad, because of the linguistic barriers, distances, costs and 
the lack of information.66 However, precise criteria on how to distinguish 
between hospital and non-hospital treatments were not laid out.67
62 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 87. 
63 For a more detailed summary, see Anne Pieter van der Mei, ‘Cross-Border Access to 
Health Care within the European Union: Recent Developments in Law and Policy’ (2003) 10 
European Journal of Health Law 369, 372-375.
64 Müller-Fauré (n 33) para 91.
65 Müller-Fauré (n 33) para 90.
66 Müller-Fauré (n 33) para 95. 
67 Including the Court’ s ambiguous statement that ‘certain services provided in a hospi-
tal environment but also capable of being provided by a practitioner in his surgery or in a 
health centre could for that reason be placed on the same footing as non-hospital services’ 
from Müller-Fauré (n 33) para 75. 
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The complete prohibition of the prior authorisation requirement for 
non-hospital services has consequences on the way the contracting of 
health care non-hospital providers is organised in Member States. The 
Court of Justice jurisprudence, by obliging the competent state to cover 
the treatment obtained by foreign providers, puts domestic contracted 
providers, who are therefore subject to various controls, in a position 
similar to that of foreign (non-contracted) providers, who are not subject 
to those controls.68 
If a Member State is operating an exclusive contracting system, whe-
re contracts are concluded with a limited number of providers, domestic 
non-contracted providers, who are in an equivalent position to foreign 
providers as regards controls and regulations, are effectively discrimina-
ted against.69 Discrimination occurs because the Member States are still, 
under EU law, free to limit (or exclude) the social coverage of treatment 
obtained from domestic non-contracted providers.
2.4. In Inizan, the Court had to deal with the relationship between 
the system of social security coverage of foreign health treatment based 
on co-ordination rules, and the system based on the primary law pro-
visions on freedom to provide services. The Court concluded that the 
co-ordination rules, which prescribe the mandatory prior authorisation 
procedure, are not contrary to primary law, because they offer the possi-
bility for the patient to receive higher social coverage (under the rules of 
the state of treatment) than under primary law (where the domestic rules 
of the competent state are applicable).70 
Furthermore, the Court aligned its interpretation of the co-ordina-
tion rules and primary law, regarding the conditions for granting prior 
authorisation. It emphasised that authorisation, under the co-ordination 
rules, must be granted when an equally effective treatment cannot be 
provided without undue delay in the state of residence, taking into acco-
unt the factors mentioned by the Court within the context of the freedom 
to provide services in Müller-Fauré (namely, his/her medical history, de-
gree of pain and the ability to conduct a professional activity).71
68 Yves Jorens, Michael Coucheir and Filip Van Overmeiren, Access to Health Care in an 
Internal Market: Impact for Statutory and Complementary Systems (Volume 18 Bulletin lux-
embourgeois des questions sociales, Luxembourg, 2005) 31.
69 Jorens, Coucheir and Van Overmeiren (n 68) 31. 
70 Inizan (n 33) para 21.
71 Inizan (n 33) para 46. This case is also important because it applied the Müller-Fauré 
logic of allowing the prior authorisation requirement for hospital treatments where the com-
petent state’s system is not a benefits-in-kind, but a reimbursement system. See Vassilis 
Hatzopoulos, ‘Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU’ in Grainne de Burca (ed), EU 
Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (OUP, Oxford 2005) 133.
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2.5. Watts was the first judgement in the Court’s jurisprudence on 
the application of the freedom to provide services rules on social secu-
rity coverage of foreign treatments to deal with the UK National Health 
Service (hereinafter: NHS).72 The case was about a British national (and 
resident) who underwent hip replacement surgery in France. Prior to the 
treatment, authorisation for the treatment in France was refused by the 
relevant NHS body (Bedford Primary Care Trust), since, in their view, 
she could have received treatment in the UK within the government’s 
NHS Plan targets, and thus without undue delay. After obtaining the 
treatment, Mrs Watts sought reimbursement, which gave rise to the pro-
ceedings. The Court found that: 
...Article 49 EC applies where a patient such as Mrs Watts receives 
medical services in a hospital environment for consideration in a 
Member State other than her State of residence, regardless of the 
way in which the national system with which that person is registe-
red and from which reimbursement of the cost of those services is 
subsequently sought operates.73
It is visible from the above statement that it is the patient-provider 
relationship in the state of treatment, and not the patient-provider or 
insurer-provider relationship in the competent state, which is the crucial 
factor for the application of the freedom to provide services provisions.
There have been several attempts to explain the applicability of the 
free provision of services rules to social security coverage of foreign he-
alth treatment from the point of view of the social security system which 
provides the coverage (the system of the competent state).74 The main 
argument is that there can be no remuneration in the case of health care 
systems in which the providers and payers are not separate, independent 
entities (notably, the NHS). 
Another argument has been put forward based on the distinction 
between ‘supply-side subsidy’ and ‘demand-side subsidy’. Supply-side 
subsidies are given by the state to the provider, and the amount is calcu-
lated by taking into account various circumstances, which may include 
specific treatment or the number of patients. The recipient finally pays an 
72 For a more detailed explanation of the judgment, see Mel Cousins, ‘Patient Mobility and 
National Health Systems’ (2007) 34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 183.
73 Watts (n 33) para 90. 
74 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Geraets-Smits (n 53) para 29; Ga-
reth Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27, 37; 
Mark Flear, ‘Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij O.Z. 
Zorgverzekeringen U.A. and E.E.M van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Z.A.O. 
Zorgverzekeringen, Judgement of the Court of 13 May 2003’ (case note) (2004) 42 CML Rev 
209, 221; TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Law in Context 
Series, CUP, Cambridge 2004) 136.
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amount which is significantly lower than the market value of the service 
provided. In contrast, demand-side subsidies are based on assistance 
with costs, meaning that the recipient of a service initiates the transac-
tion whose cost is covered by the payer (insurer). Therefore, the amount 
paid represents the real value of the service but, more importantly, the 
entire transaction, the flow of money, is controlled by the free will of the 
individual, giving a market character to the transaction, making internal 
market rules apply. 75
The Court of Justice clarified the situation in Watts. It decided that 
the way in which the national system reimbursing the costs is organised 
is irrelevant,76 and that the only important factor is whether the transac-
tion in the Member State of treatment represents the real market value 
of the service.77 Therefore, the relationship among the payer of the health 
service, the patient and the provider in the competent state has no bea-
ring on the applicability of internal market rules. Since EU primary law 
applies only in the situation where the patient pays the provider directly 
and then seeks reimbursement from the competent institution, the payer 
(patient)-provider relationship in the state of treatment is crucial in defi-
ning the applicability of internal market rules.
This logic makes sense from the internal market point of view, but 
is questionable from the social security aspect. It uses an extraordinary 
situation, of a patient being in ‘no man’s land’ between two social secu-
rity systems (which is the only situation in which this logic can apply), to 
define the fundamental relationship between market integration and the 
national systems of social security. 
However, the relevant situation is only temporary, since the pati-
ent subsequently returns home to claim reimbursement, the amount of 
which is calculated on the basis of the standard relationship between 
the competent institution and the patient (in the case of the NHS, the 
standard relationship involving full coverage). It is paradoxical that a 
situation which is atypical for an insurer-patient relationship leads to 
reimbursement based on a standard relationship, the logic of which is 
contrary to internal market logic. In that standard relationship, the servi-
ce is provided free of charge and is based on a supply-side subsidy, with 
the payer and the provider being, essentially, one entity (in the case of 
national health services).
75 Gareth Davies, ‘Competition, Free Movement, and Consumers of Public Services’ (2006) 
17 European Business Law Review 95, 98-100.
76 Interpretation supported by Johan W van de Gronden, ‘Cross-Border Health Care in the 
EU and the Organization of the National Health Care systems of the Member States: The 
Dynamics Resulting from the European Court of Justice’s Decisions on Free Movement and 
Competition Law’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 705, 711.
77 Watts (n 33) para 90.
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Next, the Court explicitly aligned interpretation of the term ‘undue 
delay’ in the context of the co-ordination rules and of the free provision of 
services.78 In addition, the Court restated79 that the existence of waiting 
lists is in itself not sufficient for a person to be refused authorisation.80 In 
that sense, the Court pointed out that the waiting lists themselves need 
to be formed in a way that allows for the health treatment to be provided 
within the time ‘which is acceptable in the light of an objective medical 
assessment of the clinical needs of the person concerned’.81 
With this statement, the Court did, seemingly, make an effort to 
legitimise the existence of waiting lists as a justification for imposing a 
barrier on the free provision of services. However, there is no real balan-
cing here between the interests of the individual patient and the interests 
of the social security system (protecting the patients as a collective, inclu-
ding those who are not able to travel abroad, or who are not informed 
of the possibilities to go abroad). The Court explicitly stated that, if the 
waiting time exceeds the ‘medically acceptable waiting time’, authorisati-
on must be granted.82 The fact that there may be more urgent cases not 
asking for authorisation (as indeed there will be, since authorisation will 
be requested precisely to bypass those who are higher on the list) is not 
taken into account, and neither is the fact that those patients may recei-
ve treatment later (than originally envisaged) because of the redirection 
of funds into covering foreign treatment.
As mentioned in 2.2,83 the Court of Justice puts the needs of an indi-
vidual patient first. This is in line with the objective of promoting freedom 
to provide and receive services within the EU. However, it must be taken 
into account that the case law in practice promotes only the freedom of 
one category of patients to receive services, namely those who are finan-
cially capable of paying the provider on the spot, to be subsequently reim-
bursed by the competent institution. Those who are unable to do so are 
not helped; on the contrary, they can find themselves in a worse position 
than they were originally in. Funds that would originally have been used 
to cover the most urgent treatments are directed to the less urgent cases 
of well-off people travelling abroad.
The consequence of the Court’s approach is that it affects the dis-
tribution choices made by the national social security systems, thereby 
diminishing the power of the Member States to organise their social 
systems. To describe these choices as being of a purely economic cha-
78 Watts (n 33) para 60.
79 Stated in Müller-Fauré (n 33) para 92. 
80 Watts (n 33) para 63.
81 Watts (n 33) para 68. 
82 Watts (n 33) para 72. 
83 Originally by Newdick (n 60).
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racter is contrary to the very social purpose of social security. Criteria 
determining priority treatments are, generally, based on an assessment 
of a person’s medical condition (instead of his/her ability to pay for the 
treatment), thereby reflecting the principle of solidarity.84 Therefore, the 
overall position of patients is not strengthened, since only some of them 
are made better off, at the expense of others, and, in the end, the number 
of covered health procedures within the whole of the EU, including both 
treatments abroad and purely domestic treatments, will not rise, but the 
order of priorities will simply be reshuffled.85
Another important aspect of Watts is that it refined the rule that the 
patient is, between the two parallel systems (co-ordination and freedom 
to provide services), entitled to the more beneficial coverage based on the 
freedom to provide services. The Court distinguished between two situ-
ations. If the cost of the treatment is higher in the competent state than 
in the state of treatment, the institution of the competent state needs to 
provide the higher reimbursement, up to the level of the real cost of the 
treatment (which the patient paid to the provider).86 If the cost is higher 
in the state of treatment, the institution of the competent state pays the 
amount that it would have paid if the treatment was provided by the com-
petent state provider, and no more.87 This applies to the situation where 
the competent state offers the treatment free of charge (like the NHS, me-
aning effectively 100% coverage), while the state of treatment covers only 
part of the costs (the often used co-payments mechanisms). Whether this 
rule (a limit on the level of the actual cost) can be translated to the other 
combinations of competent state/state of treatment, and thus potentially 
conflicting with Vanbraekel, remains questionable.88
Furthermore, the Court explained the coverage of travel and 
accommodation costs. The co-ordination rules do not entitle the patient 
to coverage of these costs, but he/she can claim them on the basis of the 
free movement rules.89 Since, under the free provision of services rules, 
84 Newdick (n 60) 1662-1663. 
85 There is also an argument that the real motivation behind the case law is, essentially, a 
power struggle, shifting the regulatory competence in the field of health care to the EU level. 
See to this effect Scott L Greer, ‘Migration of Patients and Migration of Power: Politics and 
Policy Consequences of Patient Mobility in Europe’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 908.
86 Watts (n 33) para 131. 
87 Watts (n 33) para 132.
88 If Vanbraekel logic can be applied outside the specific context of that case, namely the 
unlawful refusal of prior authorisation. 
89 Watts (n 33) para 138. Under new Regulation 987/2007 art 26(8): ‘Where the national 
legislation of the competent institution provides for the reimbursement of the costs of travel 
and stay that are inseparable from the treatment of the insured person, these costs for the 
person concerned and, if necessary, for a person who must accompany him/her, shall be 
assumed by this institution when an authorisation is granted in the case of treatment in 
another Member State.’
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the competent state provisions are applicable, the patient is entitled to 
the reimbursement of travel costs if that right is granted for treatment 
within the competent state (thus avoiding disadvantageous treatment of 
health care abroad).90
Finally, the Court dismissed the possibility that the primary law 
obligation to respect the Member States’ responsibilities for the organi-
sation and delivery of health services is contrary to the case law on the 
social security coverage of foreign health treatment, because the case law 
takes into account the need to maintain the financial balance of social 
security systems.91 
2.6. The last judgement by the Court on the application of the free 
provision of services rules on the social security coverage of health tre-
atment obtained outside the competent state was Stamatelaki.92 It dealt 
with the Greek rules prohibiting the reimbursement of health treatment 
provided by foreign private hospitals, except for children under 14 years 
of age. 
The Court found that the rules in question gave preferential tre-
atment to private non-contracted hospitals in Greece, because the 
existence of an emergency was an exception to the no coverage rule for 
Greek non-contracted private hospitals, but not for foreign non-contrac-
ted private hospitals.93 This discrimination of foreign private hospitals, 
therefore, constituted a violation of the freedom to provide services rules, 
even more clearly than was the case with the indistinctly applicable mea-
sures that imposed prior authorisation as a requirement for all treatment 
by non-contracted providers (Geraets-Smits).
3. Important ambiguities
3.1. The first important issue to be dealt with is that of the Member 
States’ autonomy to define which health care treatments are covered by 
their social security systems. One interpretation of the case law, namely 
Geraets-Smits, is that ‘all European citizens will have the right to a pac-
kage of comparable heath services throughout the European Union’.94 
90 Watts (n 33) para 140; confirmed by the Court in Acereda Herrera (n 33) para 38.
91 Watts (n 33) para 147. It has also been stated in the literature that the Court takes into 
consideration the consequences of its interference in the national welfare systems by allow-
ing certain grounds for justification of barriers to free movement. See Koen Lenaerts and 
Tinne Heremans ‘Contours of a European Social Union in the Case-Law of the European 
Court of Justice’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 101, 114.
92 [2007] ECR I-3185. 
93 Stamatelaki (n 33) para 27. 
94 Herman Nys, ‘Comparative Health Law and the Harmonization of Patients’ Rights in 
Europe’ (2001) 8 European Journal of Health Law 317, 318.
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What is the meaning of comparable? If this is to be interpreted as the 
same package of essentially the same services, then that would represent 
a true revolution in the social health care systems within the EU. Could 
this include the right to the highest level of health services, present only 
in certain of the Member States with better overall standards? This would 
mean that a patient from Bulgaria, for instance, would be entitled to the 
same health treatment as a German patient and could, thus, travel to 
those Member States which offer the treatment in question.
However, this interpretation seems a bit tenuous for two reasons: 
first, the Court explicitly stated that EU law does not require the Member 
States to extend the coverage of their social security health systems.95 Se-
cond, the case in which the Court emphasised the need to use internatio-
nal standards in determining the health treatments one is entitled to was 
based on very specific national rules which used the ambiguous criterion 
of ‘normal’ treatment for entitlement. It is a completely different situation 
in Member States with lists of specifically enumerated treatments which 
are socially covered. This diversity can hardly be overcome by anything 
except EU level legislation,96 which is hard to contemplate since the una-
nimity requirement still applies for adopting legally binding measures in 
the field of social security.97 
Since there is no harmonisation at the EU level and it is not very 
likely (due to the division of legislative social security competences98) that 
there will be one soon, there is a lot of legal uncertainty in this field. One 
possibility is to use the legal bases for harmonising the internal market, 
but the diversity of social security systems would still represent a major 
obstacle to harmonisation, and its validity in terms of the division of 
competences between the Member States and the EU would, probably, 
be challenged.99
3.2. The second important aspect of the case law concerns the dis-
tinction between hospital and non-hospital services (treatments). A solu-
tion was proposed in the literature for cases in which there are different 
definitions of ‘hospital service’ in the competent state and the state of 
treatment. According to this proposal, those treatments would be classi-
fied as non-hospital, except where there are reasons of general interest 
95 Geraets-Smits (n 33) para 87. 
96 Since Member States are free to organise their own social security systems. See Kohll (n 
33) para 18.
97 TFEU art 153(2); TFEU art 21(3).
98 Specifically, TFEU art 153(2) allows for the adoption of directives setting up ‘minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation’, with a unanimity requirement.
99 Due to the fact that Member States have the autonomy to organise their social security 
and health systems, which is recognised by both the Court in Kohll (n 33) and the primary 
law in TFEU art 153(4) for social security, and TFEU art 168(7) for public health. 
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(namely the need for planning) to classify them as hospital services, and, 
thus, to impose the prior authorisation procedure.100
There are some problems in relation to the described proposal. For a 
start, it is not clear why the state of treatment definition should be given 
priority, except to avoid the competent state deliberately preventing peo-
ple from going abroad. Perhaps there should be a little more confidence 
in the rationality of the social security bodies, since the primary purpose 
of social systems is to protect individuals, not to deprive them of the best 
possible treatment. 
Next, the problem is emphasised here of practically proving that the 
prior authorisation procedure for certain treatment is needed to facilitate 
planning and to maintain the financial stability of the system. It can be 
argued that the Court used the hospital - non-hospital distinction to avo-
id complex economic analyses of the whole of social health care systems 
in order to determine the potential consequences of patient outflows. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the Court did not go into de-
termining possibly less restrictive measures for the free provision of ser-
vices than the prior authorisation rules. It is very questionable if serious 
analyses can be carried out for every specific case, taking into account 
that the effects of new developments become visible in large social secu-
rity systems only after several years.
It is also important to note that a question arose about the status (as 
hospital or non-hospital) of health spas.101 The case was about a German 
rule which imposed additional requirements for the reimbursement of 
travel and accommodation costs for foreign treatment, when compared 
to domestic treatment. Therefore, the reimbursement of these additional 
costs for a treatment in Italy was refused, even though the cost of the tre-
atment itself was reimbursed. The Court decided that the measure was 
incompatible with the freedom to provide services.102 
It has been suggested that Leichtle should be interpreted as putting 
spa treatments outside the ambit of hospital services, thus disallowing 
the prior authorisation procedure to be imposed.103 Nevertheless, some of 
its aspects need to be emphasised. The Court did not explicitly rule out 
prior authorisation (recognition of eligibility), but dismissed one of the 
conditions that was attached to it. On the other hand, in the case of hos-
pital services, it was not required for Member States to prove concretely 
the existence of financial justifications (this was assumed, and the main 
100 Flear (n 74) 225.
101 Leichtle (n 33).
102 Leichtle (n 33) para 51. 
103 Vassillis Hatzopoulos and Do Thien Uyen, ‘The Case Law of the ECJ Concerning the Free 
provision of Services: 2000-2005’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 923, 939.
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issue became the needs of the individual patient), while it was required 
in Leichtle104 for spas.
In addition, it must be taken into account that the costs of the tre-
atment itself had already been reimbursed; so, it was harder to use the 
argument that the reimbursement of travel and accommodation costs 
could endanger the financial stability of the system, while the coverage 
of the treatment itself (albeit lower than the travel and accommodati-
on costs) could not. It is also important to note that the German rule 
attached special conditions to the coverage of additional costs of cure 
outside Germany, thereby directly treating foreign treatments less favou-
rably than domestic ones. 
Thus, a lot of uncertainty still remains in distinguishing between 
hospital and non-hospital care within the meaning of the Court of Ju-
stice case law. A solution has been proposed to alleviate some of that 
uncertainty, by way of using a Commission Recommendation enume-
rating an exhaustive list of treatments that are to be considered hospi-
tal treatments, and another list which would contain non-hospital tre-
atments.105
The basic approach of the latter proposal should be supported, 
but the choice of instrument is questionable. This is so because the re-
commendation would bypass the procedures for adopting legally bin-
ding instruments, which are more appropriate to deal with the issue. 
The basis for the latter claim is the fact that the purpose of the proposed 
recommendation would be to represent an interpretative tool, probably 
also to be used by the Court of Justice. This tool would be employed to 
interpret the case law relating to the application of primary law in the 
very delicate spheres of health care and social security. 
Since primary law, as interpreted by the Court, is legally above EU 
secondary legislation, it would be appropriate to use an instrument which 
involves at least equal guarantees of democratic participation and public 
scrutiny as in the case of secondary legislation. Furthermore, this would 
help to reduce possible criticisms that the Court of Justice is assuming 
the role of legislator in the area of the social security coverage of cross-
border health care. Moreover, defining hospital and non-hospital health 
care at the EU legislative level would further legitimise the Court’s juri-
sprudence in the field. It would thereby support the hospital – non-hospi-
tal distinction as relevant in defining social coverage of health treatment 
obtained abroad.
104 Leicthle (n 33) paras 37-51. 
105 Pedro Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the Right to Cross Border Medical Care’ (2004) 
29 EL Rev 673, 686.
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Another possibility is to use the non-binding instruments of en-
couraging co-operation between the Member States. This solution wo-
uld facilitate dialogue between the social security systems, a big gain 
for individual cross-border patients, because all the numerous practical 
complications cannot be solved through top-down EU legislation. It is 
especially important to note that the problem of distinguishing hospital 
and non-hospital care emerges only if there are different definitions in 
the state of treatment and in the competent state. Successful practical 
co-operation would solve the latter problem. Furthermore, using binding 
rules could cause opposition from social security systems, as a result of 
the EU regulating this traditionally national legal area.
Therefore, there are several options, each with advantages and flaws. 
It seems, however, that the worst choice would be to use an approach 
which would include both the flaw of putting undue pressure on national 
social security systems (thus inciting their opposition) and the flaw of 
weak democratic participation.
3.3. There is still a great deal of legal uncertainty regarding one of 
the crucial issues of the social security coverage of health treatment obta-
ined abroad, that is, the applicable tariffs. Is Vanbraekel to be considered 
as the general rule (that the patient is always entitled to the higher of the 
two tariffs), or Watts (that the reimbursement will not be higher than the 
actual cost of the foreign treatment)?106
It is necessary to distinguish between two elements here. One is the 
price (cost) of the treatment, and the other is the coverage. In Watts, the 
competent state offered 100% coverage (free of charge treatment in the 
UK), while this was not the case in the state of treatment (France). The 
Court decided that, if the cost of the equivalent treatment in the compe-
tent state is higher than the cost of the foreign treatment, the institution 
of the competent state needs to provide the higher reimbursement, up to 
the level of the real cost of the foreign treatment.107 In Vanbraekel, the 
Court held that the patient is entitled to the most advantageous coverage 
(the question being whether this reasoning is limited to the specific facts 
of that case, namely the unlawful refusal of authorisation).108 
What happens if the level of coverage (let us say 80% of the cost of 
the treatment) is lower in the competent state than in the state of tre-
atment (let us say 100% of the cost), but the treatment is more expensive 
106 The question of the applicability of free provision of services rules and the level of cover-
age has also been raised within the context of social coverage of health treatments during 
a temporary stay abroad. See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-211/08 
European Commission v Kingdom of Spain delivered on 25 February 2010 (pending).
107 Watts (n 33) para 131.
108 Vanbraekel (n 33) para 53.
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in the competent state than in the state of treatment? When the calculati-
on is made, taking into account both the cost and the coverage of equiva-
lent treatment in the competent state, the reimbursement is higher than 
if we take into account both the actual cost and the coverage in the state 
of treatment. Does the Watts reasoning (a limit on the level of the actual 
cost of the treatment) apply in this situation, since the wording is limited 
to situations in which the coverage is higher in the competent state? 
If Vanbraekel applies, then, presumably, reimbursement should be 
based on the price and the cost of equivalent treatment (equivalent to 
the actual treatment provided) in the competent state, with no reference 
(and thus no limit) to the actual cost of the treatment. On the other hand, 
how is it possible to determine what exactly ‘equivalent treatment’ is, 
especially if one of the concerned states offers different (more advanced) 
treatment for the same diagnosis from the other?
III. A revolution?
1. Rindal/Slinning 
At the end of 2008, the European Free Trade Association (hereinaf-
ter: EFTA) Court, having jurisdiction with regard to EFTA States which 
are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinaf-
ter: EEA Agreement), rendered a judgement in Rindal.109 It concerned two 
joined cases dealing with the question of patient mobility and the social 
coverage of health treatments obtained outside an EEA Member State 
(Norway). The question arose whether the national rules on social secu-
rity coverage were contrary to the EEA Agreement provisions equivalent 
to the EU primary law provisions on freedom to provide services.110
Ms Olga Rindal, a resident of Norway (Norway being the competent 
state for her social health care coverage) sustained injuries in a car acci-
dent resulting in whiplash and back pain. After a decade of torment, and 
unsuccessful surgery in Norway, Ms Rindal underwent two operations 
in Germany which improved her state of health. After that, she sought 
reimbursement of the cost of the treatments from the competent institu-
tion in Norway. Her application concerning neck surgery was refused, on 
the grounds that it was not an internationally recognised treatment for 
Ms Rindal’s condition. Reimbursement of the cost of the operation on her 
back was also refused, this time because Ms Rindal was not entitled to a 
new operation in Norway at the relevant point of time.
109 Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08 Olga Rindal and Therese Slinning v The Norwegian 
State [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 319.
110 EEA Agreement art 36 and EEA Agreement art 37.
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Ms Slinning, also a Norway resident (Norway being the competent 
state for her social health care coverage) suffered a traffic accident which 
resulted in serious brain injury. For that reason she underwent neurolo-
gical treatment in Denmark. Her application in Norway for social covera-
ge of the treatment obtained in Denmark was rejected. It was claimed by 
the relevant body that the treatment in question was an experimental/
test treatment and, therefore, not subject to coverage. Furthermore, it 
was stated that adequate treatment was offered in Norway, although this 
was not as comprehensive and intensive as the foreign treatment. Even 
more importantly, it was concluded that the domestic treatment should 
be given priority, although the foreign treatment was possibly more ad-
vanced.
The first issue dealt with the coverage of experimental/test tre-
atments (according to international medicine111) obtained abroad. The 
EFTA Court concluded that, if the experimental treatment is not covered 
in the competent state, there is no obligation to cover the expenses of 
foreign experimental treatment.112 However, if the treatment is covered 
in the competent state, and additional conditions are imposed for under-
going the said treatment abroad, those conditions represent a restriction 
on the free provision of services.113 Thus, the EFTA Court emphasised 
the principle that Member States (in this case, EEA Member States) are 
entitled to define for themselves whether experimental health treatments 
are to be socially covered. The condition is, however, that, once those 
treatments are defined, there can be no discrimination between domestic 
and equivalent foreign treatments. 
In addition to the described principle, the EFTA Court stated that 
some justifications for limiting coverage of foreign treatments, and the-
reby treating them less favourably than domestic treatments, are possi-
ble.114 The essential justification is, again, the protection of the financial 
balance of the social security system, connected to the objective of su-
staining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all.115 Since the 
relevant treatment in Ms Slinning’s case was offered in the competent 
state as part of a medical research programme in limited circumstances, 
the EFTA Court concluded that the need to maintain the research was 
adequate justification for limiting reimbursement of corresponding forei-
gn treatments. This conclusion was reached due the fact that:
111 Rindal (n 109) para 27. 
112 Rindal (n 109) para 46.
113 Rindal (n 109) para 47.
114 Rindal (n 109) para 55. 
115 Rindal (n 109) para 55.
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It may have negative consequences ... if the fact that the costs for 
such treatment in domestic hospitals are borne as part of the soci-
al security system would mean that any patient who had not been 
offered such treatment could then seek out such treatment abroad 
and get the costs reimbursed. Even if that specific experimental or 
test treatment was also carried out in the patient’s home State, a 
right for patients, who had not been selected for the experiment or 
test, to receive the treatment abroad and get reimbursed may lead to 
a reluctance in providing experimental and test treatment and thus 
seriously undermine medical research.116 
Therefore, a Member State can refuse to socially cover foreign tre-
atment that is not recognised (by international medicine) if the health 
treatment in question is not provided by that Member State or is provided 
only as part of a research project. 
The second issue dealt with the question of whether a Member State 
can refuse to cover foreign recognised treatment if adequate treatment is 
available in due time domestically. Here, the EFTA Court distinguished 
between two different situations.
If an adequate domestic treatment is available in due time (justifia-
ble in medical terms, taking into account the patient’s individual condi-
tion) and the foreign treatment is equally effective, the Member State can 
refuse to cover the expenses of the foreign treatment.117 This rule applies 
even when the foreign treatment is available sooner than the domestic 
treatment.118 
Therefore, some limitations are imposed on the possibility for pati-
ents suffering from less severe medical conditions bypassing more urgent 
cases by going abroad. As the EFTA Court pointed out, the obligation to 
cover treatments which are not yet necessary for the patients ‘would dra-
in resources away from other fields, as there would be a need to allocate 
funds to pay for more treatments, within a given period, than medically 
necessary.’119 On the other hand, if the foreign treatment is in fact more 
advanced, according to international medicine, than the adequate dome-
stic treatment, ‘the State may no longer justify prioritising its own offer 
of treatment.’120
The last sentence can have profound consequences on Member Sta-
tes’ freedom to organise their social security systems. The most impor-
116 Rindal (n 109) para 58.
117 Rindal (n 109) para 80. 
118 Rindal (n 109) para 80.
119 Rindal (n 109) para 80. 
120 Rindal (n 109) para 83. 
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tant aspect is that the application of the principle according to which 
EEA law does not require a Member State ‘to extend the range of medical 
services paid for by its social security system’121 is significantly limited.
The concept of a ‘medical service’ here does not seem to correspond 
to the concept of ‘health treatment’ (back surgery, for instance), given a 
certain diagnosis, since the foreign more effective treatment is, in fact, 
not the same treatment as the domestic, less advanced, treatment for 
the same condition. Medical service, as understood by the EFTA Court, 
obviously represents diagnosis (the disease, or the medical condition), 
like whiplash, or an eye tumour. Therefore, the EEA Member States are 
free to define the medical conditions, the diseases they cover, but cannot 
limit the choice of treatments for those diseases, once the diseases are 
among those that are covered. If Member State A’s rule stipulates that it 
will cover the costs of treating chronic diseases, this should be translated 
as meaning ‘the most advanced treatment for chronic diseases available 
in any of the EEA Member States’.
What happens if a Member State does not use (only) medical con-
ditions as the criteria for defining the scope of its social security health 
coverage, but its rules describe in detail the precise health treatments 
its social system covers? Can the patient receive coverage of a foreign 
treatment that is more advanced than the one specified by the competent 
state’s rules for the same disease? The EFTA Court recognises the Mem-
ber States’ right to exclude certain treatments from coverage, on the ba-
sis of objective, non-discriminatory criteria.122 However, it seems this sta-
tement relates to defining covered medical conditions, while it is unclear 
which criterion applies for treatments that are enumerated in detail.
Does the same reasoning apply within the context of the co-ordina-
tion rules, taking into account the Court of Justice applying the same 
criteria (under the co-ordination rules and free movement rules) in defi-
ning ‘undue delay’?123 This is especially significant, since it would mean 
the coverage of more advanced (and, presumably, more expensive) foreign 
121 Rindal (n 109) para 82; The equivalent principle was stated by the Court of Justice in 
Case C-157/99 BSM Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and HTM Peerbooms v Stich-
ting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473 para 87.
122 Rindal (n 109) para 82. The principle stems from Case 238/82 Duphar BV and oth-
ers v The Netherlands State [1984] ECR 523 para 22 concerning the exclusion of certain 
medicines from the social package. The reason for the Court’s conclusion that there was 
no breach of free movement of goods rules was based on the fact that the equally effective, 
but cheaper, medicines were covered. The Court, however, followed different reasoning in 
finding an obstacle to free movement of goods in Case C-38/03 Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [2005] OJ C57/6 concerning the social coverage of 
wheelchairs.
123 Case C-372/04 The Queen on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care 
Trust Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325 para 60 
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treatments on the basis of foreign tariffs. The reasoning of giving prior-
ity to the more effective treatment was previously applied, concerning 
Regulation 1408/71, in Pierik, which led to the amendment of the co-
ordination rules to exclude such a possibility.124 
Finally, will the Court of Justice adopt the same reasoning as the 
EFTA Court in its jurisprudence?125 Answering these questions seems 
crucial for the future of patient mobility in the EU. If more advanced fo-
reign treatments, not available in the competent state, must be covered, 
what is left of the competent state’s freedom to decide what to exclude 
from the social package? Therefore, the relationship between the Mem-
ber States’ freedom to decide on the exclusion of certain treatments from 
coverage and the patients’ freedom to receive more advanced foreign tre-
atments is an essential issue. Let us hope that future judgements, by 
both the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice, will offer some guidance 
in this respect.
2. Elchinov
The most recent case to come before the Court of Justice concerns 
a Bulgarian patient (Bulgaria being the competent state) who obtained 
health treatment in Germany. Mr Elchinov was diagnosed with a tumour 
in his eye. Unfortunately, the most advanced treatment available in Bul-
garia for Mr Elchinov’s diagnosis was in fact surgery to remove the eye. 
This treatment is covered by the national rules, which stipulate that a pa-
tient is entitled to social coverage of ‘other eyeball operations’ and ‘highly 
technical radiotherapy for oncological and non-oncological conditions’. 
The statutory definition is, thus, very vague, and, consequently, broad.
Mr Elchinov, instead of undergoing the removal of his eye, underwent 
highly advanced treatment in Germany, which helped his condition. Su-
bsequently, he sought reimbursement of the cost of the German health 
treatment. The relevant court referred several questions to the Court of 
Justice.126
124  Case 117/77 Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v G. Pierik [1978] 
ECR 825 para 22. This led to the changes enacted by Council Regulation (EEC) 2793/81 
of 17 September 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, 
and Regulation (EEC) 574/72 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71. The latter inserted the rule that for the authorisation to be granted the treatment 
in question must be among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State 
of residence. 
125 Case C-173/09 Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v National Health Insurance Fund (pending).
126 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia – grad (Bulgaria) 
lodged on 14 May 2009 - Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v National Health Insurance Fund (Case 
C-173/09).
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The essential issue is whether social security systems are obliged 
to cover foreign medical treatments which are not offered by domestic 
health care systems. On one side, there is the principle that EU law does 
not require Member States to extend the range of medical services they 
cover.127 On the other side, there is EFTA Court jurisprudence, according 
to which (EEA) Member States cannot prioritise their own, less effective 
treatments.128 
The question, of course, is whether the term ‘medical services’ me-
ans ‘health treatments’ or ‘medical conditions’. If the competent state 
defines covered health care by referring to medical conditions (diagnosis), 
does this mean that the state in question must not prioritise its own tre-
atments for those conditions, against foreign, more advanced ones? If so, 
the competent state would have to cover the most advanced treatment for 
a certain diagnosis provided anywhere in the EU. 
What if the competent state defines covered health care by referring 
to specified, enumerated treatments? Would those provisions be contrary 
to EU law if they included, in effect, only the treatments provided by do-
mestic providers? It seems that the EFTA Court, when ruling that states 
are free to exclude certain treatments from their coverage,129 really means 
that they are free to exclude certain medical conditions (diagnoses). It 
remains to be seen whether the same logic applies to enumerated tre-
atments.
What if the competent state defines social health coverage by re-
ferring to the type of treatment in a very general way, as in the Bulgarian 
case? Should the Bulgarian rules be interpreted as meaning ‘the most 
advanced oncological treatment available within the EU’?
If the Court obliges Member States to cover more effective foreign tre-
atments, the question of tariffs will also become significant. Application 
of the rules of the state of treatment (under the co-ordination system) can 
have serious financial consequences for Member States with less advan-
ced domestic treatments. Should the possible justifications for limiting 
coverage of foreign treatment be redefined, in line with the principle of 
covering the most effective treatment? In other words, should specific 
criteria apply to the Member States with less technical and financial he-
alth resources, since they will probably be most affected by the outflow of 
patients to the Member States providing the most advanced (and, presu-
mably, the most expensive) treatments. Let us hope the Court of Justice 
provides guidance in these matters.
127 Geraets-Smits (n 121) para 87. 
128 Rindal (n 109) para 83. 
129 Rindal (n 109) para 82. 
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IV. Draft directive on patients’ rights
1. Overview and problems
The analysed case law has resulted in initiatives to resolve the issues 
raised by regulating patient mobility at the EU level by way of secondary 
legislation. This is a desirable development, taking into account the exi-
sting ambiguities as well as the political and social importance of the 
social security coverage of health care in Europe. However, it was not 
hard to predict that, due to the great diversity of social systems and 
living standards in the EU, it would not be easy to reach agreement on 
this matter. This is why the Commission proposal of 2008 (hereinafter: 
Original Proposal),130 despite several changes introduced during the le-
gislative process, has, so far, not been adopted by the Council. Analysis 
here is focused mainly on the last available version (hereinafter: Directive 
Proposal),131 accompanied by a description of some differences with res-
pect to the Original Proposal.
The Directive Proposal is based on TFEU art 114 (former EC Treaty 
art 95) on the approximation of Member States’ laws for the establis-
hment and functioning of the internal market, prescribing the ordinary 
legislative procedure (co-decision) for adoption. The other legal basis is 
TFEU art 168(5) (incentive measures) concerning Directive Proposal art 
13 on European reference networks and art 15 regarding co-operation on 
health technology assessment. The choice of the legal basis is not surpri-
sing, since it is in line with the Court of Justice position that the social 
security coverage of health treatment obtained outside the Member State 
in which the patient is socially insured falls under the ambit of internal 
market rules. The main emphasis of the Directive Proposal is precisely 
the described situation.
The Directive Proposal offers certain solutions regarding the issue 
of social security related to patient mobility. It contains compromises to 
satisfy the EU Member States. However, several Member States (inter alia 
Spain) have opposed the proposed solutions.132 An important reason for 
their opposition is the definition of Member State of affiliation (the state 
covering the foreign treatment). 
130 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care’ COM (2008) 414 final, 
02 July 2008 (hereinafter: Original Proposal). 
131 Council (EU), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health care’ annexed to the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives’ note to the Council Interinstitutional File 2008/0142 (COD) 
16005/09, 26 November 2009, retrieved from: http://www.epha.org/a/2878 (hereinafter: 
Directive Proposal). 
132 M Slegers, ‘Ministers Stall on Cross-Border Health-Care’ Europolitics (Brussels 2 Decem-
ber 2009) 9: 
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The Directive Proposal provides that the Member State of affiliation 
is the one that is competent to grant prior authorisation under the co-
ordination rules.133 The problem here is that, according to Regulation 
883/2004, the cost of authorised health care obtained by a pensioner 
outside his/her state of residence is covered by the institution of the state 
of residence if the latter state has opted for reimbursement on the basis 
of fixed amounts.134 The Member State of residence grants authorisation 
in the described situation.135 Therefore, it is hard to predict when the Pa-
tients Rights’ Directive is to become adopted as part of the relevant legal 
framework.
Even when it is actually adopted, the directive will leave important 
issues unresolved. For instance, it does not reflect the new development 
in the jurisprudence arising from Rindal.136 The distinction between the 
medical conditions and medical treatments is not mentioned in the Direc-
tive Proposal. Therefore, the question of the real scope of Member States’ 
freedom to define the social coverage of health care is left unanswered.
The Directive Proposal does not solve the problem of the parallel 
existence of two different systems of social security coverage of foreign 
health treatments: one based on the co-ordination rules and the other 
based on the Court of Justice case law and the proposed directive itself. 
Since those systems contain important disparities, the choice of met-
hod is essential, both for the patients and the national social security 
systems. Of course, the current situation, which the Directive Proposal 
does not solve, is detrimental to legal certainty and discourages patients 
from free movement and receiving health treatment abroad.
One of the ambiguous areas in the relationship between the co-or-
dination rules and the Directive Proposal concerns the level of coverage. 
The Directive Proposal, in art 8(3), prescribes that the amount of social 
security reimbursement for foreign health treatment shall not exceed the 
actual cost of the health care received. This may be contrary to Vanbrae-
kel, which entitles the patient to receive the reimbursement based on the 
competent state’s higher tariff instead of the state of treatment’s (effecti-
133 Directive Proposal (n 131) art 4.
134 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1 (hereinafter: Regu-
lation 883/2004) art 27(5). Not surprisingly, Spain is one of those states (and is hosting 
many pensioners from the northern Member States of the EU). See to that effect Regulation 
(EC) 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 lay-
ing down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems [2009] OJ L284/1 (hereinafter: Regulation 987/2009) Annex 3. 
135 Regulation 883/2004 art 27(5). 
136 Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08 Olga Rindal and Therese Slinning v The Norwegian 
State [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 319. 
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vely paid) lower tariff.137 Since the Court of Justice has based Vanbraekel 
on the direct application of the highest source of EU law,138 its stance 
towards the newly proposed solution is not easy to predict. 
On the other hand, the Directive Proposal seems to be in line with 
Watts.139 Does this mean that the principle stated in the latter case, of im-
posing the amount of the actual costs as the limit of reimbursement, also 
applies to cases where the competent state’s level of coverage (percentage 
of the cost of the treatment) is not higher than the coverage in the state 
of treatment, but where the overall reimbursement is, due to the higher 
costs in the competent state? Answers to these questions are awaited.140
Furthermore, the requirements for granting authorisation under the 
Directive Proposal impose additional restrictions on the patient wishing to 
travel abroad to obtain health treatment. The Directive Proposal, in article 
9 (3a), allows the patient to choose either the co-ordination system, or the 
Directive Proposal System. Next, it states that authorisation may be re-
fused (in addition to other, non-specified reasons in the general interest) if:
1. The patient is not entitled to the treatment in question.
2. The treatment can be provided in the Member State of affiliation 
within a time-limit which is medically justifiable, taking into ac-
count the current state of health and the probable course of the 
illness of the person concerned.
3. The patient, according to a clinical evaluation with reasonable 
certainty, will be exposed to a patient safety risk that cannot be 
considered to be normal, taking into account the potential benefit 
for the patient of the sought cross-border health care.
4. The general public, with reasonable certainty, will be exposed to 
a substantial safety hazard as a result of the cross-border health 
care in question.141
Therefore, the Directive Proposal opens the door for additional gro-
unds for justification when compared to the co-ordination rules and the 
previous case law. However, the Original Proposal, in arts 3 and 9, was 
even more radical in that respect. It completely separated the criteria for 
defining ‘undue delay’ or ‘medically justifiable time’ from the criteria for 
granting authorisation under the co-ordination rules.142 Furthermore, it 
137 Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance nationale des mutualités chré-
tiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363 para 53. 
138 Vanbraekel (n 137) para 53. 
139 Case C-372/04 The Queen on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care 
Trust Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, para 131. 
140 An equivalent provision has also been inserted into Regulation 987/2009 art 26(7).
141 Directive Proposal (n 131) art 9(5).
142 Original Proposal (n 130) art 3(2). 
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did not leave the possibility for the patient to choose the applicable regi-
me (if the conditions for applying the co-ordination rules were met, those 
rules were to become applicable).143 The question now remains whether 
the Court will interpret the directive (if, eventually, it is adopted) in a lite-
ral way, or more in line with the previous case law.
The definition of care which may be subject to prior authorisation, 
and its relationship with the Court of Justice distinction between hos-
pital and non-hospital treatments, is also ambiguous. It includes, apart 
from overnight stays in hospitals, for instance, health care which requ-
ires planning because it involves the ‘use of highly specialized and cost-
intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment’.144 This definition 
can be interpreted broadly, in fact, more broadly than the Court’s notion 
of hospital treatment (which is, in itself, vague). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Directive Proposal does 
not define ‘international medical standards’. Therefore, the questions of 
which international documents can be used, and how broadly the term 
should be defined, remain unanswered. 
An important addition to the case law lies in the part of the Directi-
ve Proposal dealing with national contact points for cross-border health 
care. These should be set up in every Member State (both for outgoing 
and incoming patients) and should provide patients with all the relevant 
information.145 
Finally, it is important to note that the Directive Proposal contains 
an obligation imposed on the Member State of treatment not to discrimi-
nate against incoming patients from other Member States.146 However, 
the Member State of treatment can impose restrictions justified by over-
riding reasons of general interest.147 The rationale of these restrictions is 
to prevent an increase in waiting times, due to potentially large numbers 
of patients coming from other Member States to obtain treatment.148
V. Impact on new Member States and Croatia
The first problem new Member States have to tackle has already be-
come visible.149 As was observed in the literature, it is hard for new Mem-
143 Wolf Sauter, ‘The Proposed Patients’ Rights Directive and the Reform of (Cross-Border) 
Healthcare in the European Union’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 109, 119.
144 Directive Proposal (n 131) art 9(2). 
145 Directive Proposal (n 131) art 7. 
146 Directive Proposal (n 131) art 5(3). 
147 Directive Proposal (n 131) art 5(3). 
148 Preamble to the Directive Proposal (n 131) para 12(a).
149 Case C-173/09 Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v National Health Insurance Fund (pending). 
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ber States to adopt all the newest technologies for providing health care 
treatments.150 This is caused, inter alia, by the generally much lower per 
capita expenditure on health care in the new Member States compared 
to the old Member States.151 Therefore, the new Member States are the 
ones most likely to find themselves in the situation where more advanced 
health treatments are available abroad. The adoption by the Court of 
Justice of the patient’s freedom to receive socially covered foreign treat-
ment, more advanced than domestic treatment (already stipulated by the 
EFTA Court), could thus lead to a significant outflow of patients towards 
western, more developed, Member States.
It seems that the most important factor influencing the Member 
States’ obligations to socially cover foreign health treatments will be the 
way the rules on social security coverage are phrased. In this context, 
statutory rules like the Croatian ones, according to which the complete 
cure of malignant diseases will be paid in full by the Croatian Health 
Insurance Institute (read together with broad statutory definitions of so-
cially covered types of health care),152 translated into EFTA Court lan-
guage and applied within the EU context, may be understood to include 
‘the most effective cure of malignant diseases available anywhere within 
the EU’.
Therefore, if the right to social coverage of more effective foreign 
treatment is accepted by the Court of Justice, a Member State wanting to 
limit the scope of health care its social system covers needs to define that 
coverage more precisely, by using objective, non-discriminatory crite-
ria.153 On the other hand, it becomes questionable whether a precise, de-
tailed list of included (or excluded) treatments would in itself be contrary 
to the internal market, if a Member State is unable to justify why certain 
precise treatments are, for example, excluded (apart from the reason that 
they are not provided by the domestic health system due to a lack of 
resources). Another problem is that the EFTA Court equates treatments 
and conditions (diagnosis) when it states that the Member States are free 
150 Alina Kaczorowska, ‘A Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the 
Right to Effective and Speedy Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 European 
Law Journal 345, 367; AP den Exter ‘Legal Consequences of EU Accession for Central and 
Eastern European Health Care Systems’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 556, 562.
151 WHO ‘National Health Accounts’ <http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/index.html> 
accessed on 20 May 2010.
152 Compulsory Health Insurance Act (Official Gazette 150/08, 94/09, 153/09) art 16 (Za-
kon o obveznom zdravstvenom osiguranju NN 150/08, 94/09, 153/09, cl. 16.) author’s 
translation. The Act also refers to the financial capacity of the Institute in art 15, which con-
tains rather broad definitions of the types of health care the coverage of which the patients 
are entitled to.
153 Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08 Olga Rindal and Therese Slinning v The Norwegian 
State [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 319, para 82. 
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to define the treatments they cover.154 What happens, then, if the covered 
treatments for each disease are precisely defined by statutes? Can the 
Member States exclude treatments for the same disease which are more 
effective than those enumerated by law?
Nevertheless, it seems that, for the time being, the safest way for the 
Member States to limit their coverage is to use extensive lists of included 
(positive lists) or excluded (negative lists) treatments instead of broad de-
finitions like ‘normal treatments’ or ‘specialist care’. However, the trend 
seems to be to limit such Member State autonomy further, so the final 
outcome remains to be seen. In any case, in order to prevent the un-
controlled outflow of patients to Member States with the most advanced 
health care, which may seriously jeopardise the stability of their social 
security systems, new Member States need to study in detail the EU legal 
framework and adapt their own legislation where necessary.
The second important element the new Member States have to be 
aware of is the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the co-ordination rules. 
As stated in Inizan, the Member States may not refuse to grant autho-
risation if an equally effective treatment cannot be provided in the state 
where the patient is resident without undue delay, taking into account 
his/her level of pain, medical history, and ability to carry out professional 
activity.155 The Court’s reasoning thus significantly decreases the possibi-
lities for Member States to reduce the outflow of patients abroad. 
The latter development regarding the interpretation of the co-ordina-
tion rules can have significant consequences for the new Member States. 
The basis for this claim is the fact that, under the co-ordination rules, the 
competent state covers the costs of foreign health treatment according to 
the foreign (the state of treatment’s) rules, and, thus, the foreign tariffs. 
The Slovak government suggested that health services in some Member 
States can be 5-10 times more expensive than in other Member States.156 
It is also important to note that the Member State with the lowest 
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) of the old Member 
States in 2008 was Portugal, with 76.0% of the EU average, while Greece 
was second with 94.3% of the EU average. The new Member State with 
the highest GDP per capita in PPS in 2008 was Cyprus with 95.9% of the 
EU average. Bulgaria had the lowest GDP per capita in PPS in 2008, with 
41.3% of the EU average.157 If we take into account only the new Central 
154  Rindal (n 153) para 82. 
155 Case C-56/01 Patricia Inizan v Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine 
[2003] ECR I-12403 para 46.
156 Commission (EC) ‘Community Action on Health Services’ (Summary report of the res-
ponses to the consultation) SEC (2006) 1195/4, 26 September 2006 12. 
157 No data available for Romania. 
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European Member States, the highest GDP per capita in PPS in 2008 was 
in Slovenia, with 90.9% of the EU average. In 2008, Croatia had a GDP 
per capita in PPS at the level of 62.7% of the EU average.158 
Therefore, patients from new Member States are less likely to travel 
to old Member States under primary law rules (according to which they 
have to pay for the treatment on the spot and subsequently claim reim-
bursement) since coverage will be based on competent state tariffs. Mo-
reover, the obligation to pay the provider on the spot can act as a strong 
disincentive for those patients. 
However, under the co-ordination rules, coverage is settled between 
the two social insurers (so the patient, usually, does not have to pay the 
provider on the spot for the whole cost of treatment) and the applicable 
tariff is the state of treatment tariff. Of course, if, for example, Poland has 
to cover according to German tariffs the treatment of patients who travel 
to Germany in order to bypass Polish waiting lists, then that could cause 
financial problems for the Polish social security system. 
These problems could result in a shift from using the severity of 
diagnosis as a criterion for determining the level of coverage (and the 
level of co-payment, the contribution of the patient in the cost of the 
treatment) towards using prices, thereby undermining solidarity within 
the social security system.159 In any case, it is not likely that EU law on 
patient mobility will reduce the direct contribution of patients in health 
care costs.
EU law on patient mobility can have some positive effects on the new 
Member States and Croatia. One positive aspect is that it may provide an 
incentive for more co-operation and practical co-ordination between the 
social security systems of the Member States and lead to an increase in 
efficiency.160 
This increased co-operation may be used to alleviate problems of 
limited resources and waiting lists by developing policies of referring cer-
tain patients abroad in particular cases. A more advanced stage would be 
to ‘divide work’, in the sense that individual Central European Member 
States specialise in a different highly advanced treatment, so that the 
social systems can refer patients among themselves. This would be es-
pecially significant for smaller Member States which, due to the lack of 
funds and demand (because of the limited numbers of patients in need 
158 According to EUROSTAT <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&i
nit=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb010> accessed on 20 May 2010.
159 This means that the higher percentage of co-payments would be demanded from the 
patient for more expensive treatments of the most serious diseases. 
160 See Vassillis Hatzopoulos, ‘A (more) Social Europe: A Political Crossroad or a Legal One-
Way? Dialogues between Luxembourg and Lisbon’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 1599, 1617. 
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of certain treatments), cannot maintain feasible human and technical 
resources (involving high fixed costs) for conducting certain treatments.
VI. Proposed course of action
Patients travelling to other Member States in order to obtain tre-
atment are still a relatively rare phenomenon in the EU. The European 
Commission estimates that around 1% of total health-care spending re-
lates to this area.161 However, a significant increase has been seen in the 
last few years, representing an upward trend.162 Therefore, the social si-
gnificance of the topic is constantly rising, emphasising the need for more 
legal certainty at the European level.
It is first essential to unite the two existing systems of social secu-
rity coverage of health care obtained abroad, preferably through a single 
legislative instrument, to avoid the existence of two parallel systems, one 
not clearly delineated from the other (thus confusing patients regarding 
the possibilities for them to obtain foreign treatment). There is no reason 
why this could not be done as part of the existing co-ordination rules. 
These rules have been in existence for decades and are familiar to the 
social security authorities. Another important aspect is that the co-ordi-
nation rules are based on directly applicable regulations, which are thus 
a more effective tool for maintaining a coherent policy, at the European 
level, than directives, which need to be transposed into Member States’ 
legislation. 
The co-ordination rules should, therefore, incorporate the case law 
on the right to receive more advantageous reimbursement from the com-
petent state.163 It should be made clear that, in every situation, two cal-
culations are made. One calculation is based on the costs and coverage of 
the equivalent (to the obtained) treatment in the competent state, and the 
other on the costs and coverage within the state of treatment. It should 
also be made clear that a limit is set at the level of the actual cost of the 
treatment. It is, however, necessary for the Court of Justice to clarify its 
position to avoid the risk of secondary legislation being contrary to the 
Court’s interpretation of primary law. Without the Court’s clarification, 
the only way is to literally transcribe the Court of Justice’s statements 
on the topic.
161 Commission (EC), ‘Community action on health services’ (Summary report of the res-
ponses to the consultation) SEC (2006) 1195/4, 26 September 2006 7.
162 Summary report (n 161) 8.
163 Already present, to a certain extent, in Regulation (EC) 987/2009 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implement-
ing Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ 
L284/1 art 26(7). 
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Second, it is imperative to resolve the problems of legal uncertainty 
in defining conditions and treatments which are to be covered by natio-
nal social security packages. It is especially important to determine the 
relationship between the national social security system’s right to define 
the socially covered medical conditions and its obligation to cover foreign 
more effective treatments which are different from those offered by the 
domestic health system. Of course, it is necessary first to hear the Court 
of Justice stance on the matter (whether it will use the same logic as the 
EFTA Court), which will probably occur in the coming Elchinov judge-
ment.164 
To protect the stability of social security systems, especially those 
less technically modern and not financially strong, it is essential to give, 
by means of EU legislation, freedom to Member States to clearly defi-
ne treatments which will not be covered, even if they are more effective 
than the treatments available on their own territory. This approach wo-
uld further strengthen the Member States’ freedom to define their social 
packages, by ruling out the possibility of positive and negative lists of so-
cially covered treatments being contrary to the internal market, because 
of indirectly discriminating cross-border patients.165 
If Member States are not allowed to exclude from their social pac-
kages certain treatments, while including other treatments for the same 
diagnosis, Member States might opt to entirely exclude certain diagnoses 
from coverage (in order not to be accused of giving preference to domestic 
health treatments over foreign ones). In the end, these developments co-
uld have a detrimental effect on patient mobility. In order to deal directly 
with the division of competence between the EU and Member States, the 
use of (binding) legislation seems necessary.
Third, a need exists to legally define international medical standards, 
since they are used by the Court of Justice as a benchmark for assessing 
the social security systems’ obligation to cover foreign health treatments. 
The critical questions here are: Which standards are relevant? Which 
international documents should be used? Should we be limited only to 
Europe, or should we try to find a global common standard?166 What 
about situations where there is no consensus of the scientific commu-
164 Case C-173/09 Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v National Health Insurance Fund (pending). 
165 The EFTA Court stated that EEA States may decide that certain treatments are not of-
fered domestically if the criteria for the exclusion are objective and non-discriminatory. See 
Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08 Olga Rindal and Therese Slinning v The Norwegian State 
[2008] EFTA Ct Rep 319 para 82. The question is, however, if the specified lists of covered 
treatments (not conditions) can be seen as indirectly discriminating providers who provide 
different treatments for the same diagnosis.
166 A question raised by TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union 
(Law in Context Series, CUP, Cambridge 2004) 137. 
207CYELP 6 [2010] 167-208
nity? Which part of the scientific community should be taken into acco-
unt? Which methods of control and verification should be used? 
In this regard, it is important to investigate the legal possibilities 
and instruments to define those standards, namely whether to use bin-
ding or non-binding instruments. Again, taking into account the diversity 
of social security systems and how politically sensitive the issue is, a 
bottoms-up approach of non-binding co-operation between the national 
social security systems (with guidance from the Commission) seems the 
best course of action. 
The EU should organise further wide consultation to receive feed-
back from all the interested parties and then bring them together to de-
termine points of agreement and disagreement. This approach would also 
be in the best interest of the social security authorities, because it would 
give them the chance to actively take part in the process of something 
many of them could call ‘damage control’. In any case, legislative pre-
ssure from the EU might cause dissatisfaction from the Member States, 
which can be seen regarding the Directive Proposal.
Fourth, since waiting lists are one of the strongest incentives for the 
cross-border movement of patients,167 EU action in the area is needed. 
One possibility is to set up a system of European waiting lists which wo-
uld be used to fix imbalances which might arise from significant outflows 
of patients from certain Member States. Developing European centres of 
quality for specific health treatments and dispersing them within the EU 
is another way to find a balance between different social security systems 
and regions within the Union. Again, the choice of legal instruments and 
methods needs to be investigated in detail. The main impetus should 
again be provided by the social security bodies, which are best equipped 
in terms of expertise to deal with this issue.
It is also important to note that, even with the adoption of the Pati-
ents’ Rights Directive, significant room will remain for Member States to 
address issues of cross-border health care independently. This is espe-
cially the case in the area of defining health conditions and treatments 
which are covered by social security packages, and also criteria for defi-
ning those packages (how to enumerate the covered treatments, whether 
to use treatments or conditions as benchmarks, and so on). 
The cost containment policies of the Member States will be affected 
by the free movement of patients. It is thus important for the Member Sta-
tes to investigate the best ways to define their social coverage, in terms 
of maintaining the solidarity of social security systems. Another question 
167 Visible in Case C-372/04 The Queen on the Application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Pri-
mary Care Trust Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325 para 90. 
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is whether a need will arise for states to shift away from the severity of 
the treated condition towards the price of treatment as the crucial factor 
in determining the amount (percentage) of basic social security coverage 
of a given procedure. Therefore, intensified dialogue between the EU and 
the Member States is needed.
VII. Conclusion
EU law on patient mobility has evolved over the course of the last 
12 years. Unfortunately, all the issues raised have not yet been solved. 
Furthermore, new questions have arisen from the recent EFTA Court 
case law, which does not contribute to an increase of legal certainty at 
the EU level.
This legal certainty can be achieved by two types of measures: bin-
ding legislation and co-operation among national social security systems. 
Binding rules are needed in areas which directly delineate the division 
of competence between the EU and the Member States (the freedom of 
Member States to define the packages of covered health treatments). The-
se legislative measures should maintain the freedom of Member States to 
define their social packages, even if this means excluding certain more 
advanced foreign treatments from coverage.
 Maintaining the mentioned freedom is necessary to protect the fi-
nancial stability of social health care systems in less developed Member 
States, preserving access to health care of less well-off patients (and thus 
solidarity). Limiting the Member States’ freedom to define their social se-
curity packages may, on the other hand, lead to exclusion from coverage 
of certain diagnoses, which would be detrimental to patient cross-border 
mobility.
In more technical areas, such as defining hospital and non-hospital 
treatment and international medical standards, the expertise and experi-
ence of social security institutions speak in favour of a more bottoms-up 
approach. However, if legislative EU action is used in the latter areas, it 
should be subjected to the maximum level of democratic participation 
and public scrutiny, due to the politically and socially sensitive nature of 
the issue.
Finally, national social security officials and policy makers should 
become acquainted with the legal developments at the EU level. An in-
depth knowledge of EU law on patient mobility is necessary in order for 
the national systems to formulate their regulations in a manner which 
respects the EU legal framework, while protecting the basic social objec-
tive, the solidarity of the national systems.
